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ABSTRACT  
 
Using panel data pertaining to large Polish (non-financial) firms this paper examines the 
determinants of employment change during the period 1996-2002. Paying particular attention to 
the asymmetry hypothesis we investigate the impact of own wages, outside wages, output 
growth, regional characteristics and sectoral affiliation on the evolution of employment.  
In keeping with the ‘right to manage’ model we find that employment dynamics are not affected 
negatively by alternative wages.  
Furthermore, in contrast to the early transition period, we find evidence that employment levels 
respond to positive sales growth (in all but state firms). The early literature, (e.g. Kőllő, 1998) 
found that labour hoarding lowered employment elasticities in the presence of positive demand 
shocks. Our findings suggest that inherited labour hoarding may no longer be a factor.   
We argue that the present pattern of employment adjustment is better explained by the role of 
insiders. This tentative conclusion is hinged on the contrasting behaviour of state and privatised 
companies and the similar behaviour of privatised and new private companies. We conclude that 
lower responsiveness of employment to both positive and negative changes in revenue in state 
firms is consistent with the proposition that rent sharing by insiders is stronger in the state sector. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In a macroeconomic context characterised by 5% economic growth but 20% unemployment 
(Poland, 2004, 1
st quarter) the issue of employment determination assumes particular 
importance. Using detailed firm level panel data relating to large Polish firms between 1996 and 
2002, we concentrate on examining potential micro determinants of employment growth in 
Poland. We motivate our investigation with reference both to the existing economics literature 
on firm behaviour as well as to the  Polish context. Research in the early years of transition 
reflected the view that state firms, faced by soft budget constraints, would not be willing to 
eliminate the excessive levels of labour hoarding inherited from the socialist period, and hence 
the quantity side of the labour market would exhibit inertia. Add to this the fact that employees 
held actual or effective control rights to many enterprises and the expectation of insider 
dominated outcomes was of particular concern. In this context, the observed enterprise 
adjustments that did occur were viewed by some as surprising. Firms did respond to output 
shocks by downsizing labour and wages. These adjustments reflected the imposition of hard 
budget constraints, across all ownership groups. 
As the privatisation process has become embedded and the industrial structure more 
consolidated, later research (Grosfeld and Nivet, 1997) has pointed to considerable heterogeneity 
in enterprise responses. Indeed, behaviour has been described as being dependent on ownership, 
firm size, local labour market conditions and the nature of ‘shock’ experienced. Still more recent 
research has developed certain of these themes further (Christev and Fitzroy, 2002). 
 
We draw on, but extend, the existing literature and provide an updated account of the micro 
foundations of labour demand and the evolving structure of corporate governance in Poland. Our 
contribution is fourfold. First, we take a new and robust approach to capturing the important 
heterogeneity among firms’ responses to output shocks and relate this to several characteristics 
of interest. Second, we provide new evidence regarding the persistence of insider influence. 
Third, in using more recent data, we are able to comment on the continuation or otherwise of a 
variety of ‘stylised facts’ emerging from the earlier literature and, in so doing, provide a 
contemporary insight into the determinants of labour demand in large Polish firms. Finally, we 
hint at an alternative interpretation of the role of outside options and surmise that location may 
play a subtler role than that reflected simply in the local labour market.  
We find that a) previous employment and internal wage levels influence current employment in 
the anticipated way; b) the asymmetrical effects on employment of positive and negative shocks, 
found in earlier empirical studies disappear, suggesting that inherited labour hoarding is no 
longer a general problem; c) revenue growth is positively related to employment growth in both 
privatised and new private firms but not among state firms – pointing towards the persistence of 
insider power in such firms; d) similarly, employment sensitivity to negative revenue shocks is 
lower in the state sector e) the development of the regional infrastructure is positively associated 
with employment growth, suggesting a different interpretation of the effects of standard outside 
regional variables may be necessary. 
 
We proceed as follows. Section 2 provides an outline review of the most relevant literature. 
Section 3 describes our econometric approach. In section 4, following a discussion of the data, 
we detail our various empirical specifications. Section 5 presents the results and relates them to 
our central hypotheses and section 6 concludes the paper.   
RELEVANT LITERATURE  
2.1. Theoretical framework 
There is a long history of both theoretical and empirical literature relating to aspects of 
employment behaviour in various categories of enterprise, in various countries, at various times. 
The transition process has provided a new and fertile ground for such studies. In this section we 
reflect briefly on the literature most relevant to our investigation. In doing this we motivate a 
series of testable hypotheses and provide a context within which to understand our findings
1. 
Our main focus in this paper is on the link between corporate control characteristics and the 
employment behaviour of firms. This can be analysed within the context of at least three 
different theoretical models. We elaborate on them briefly below though make no claim to 
testing differences between the models.
2 Rather, for our purposes, they motivate parallel 
conclusions regarding the possible indicators of insiders’ positions within an empirical 
framework of employment equations. 
First, the issue of ‘insider control’ can be analysed within the classical framework of the 
literature on employee control (Ward (1958); Vanek (1970); Ireland and Law (1982)). This is a 
well-rehearsed literature arguing that firms dominated by insiders have low employment 
responsiveness to product demand shocks. Indeed, the labour managed firm always varies 
employment “by a smaller amount in response to given price changes than do their capitalist 
counterparts” (Laidler and Estrin, 1989). Given the extent, to which state firms have been 
controlled by insiders in both the late socialist period and in the transition period, we expect to 
observe either employee control or at least the strong position of employees in the bargaining 
process and hence potentially lower employment adjustments to output changes
3. In addition, in 
cases where subsequent privatisations and reforms haven’t sufficiently modified the internal 
control structures, we may expect those effects to prevail after privatisation. From this point of 
view, using new private firms as a benchmark is an important empirical test. 
Second, the employee ownership models can be easily incorporated as a limiting case of more 
recent ‘efficient contract’ models, best exemplified by the seminal paper of Brown and 
                                                           
1 Appendix 1 summarises the key literature. 
2 For a good and accessible discussion of the problems relating to  empirically testing employment determination 
models, see Booth (1995). 
3 Earle and Estrin (1996) and Köllo (1998) offer a good discussion of the insiders’ control model in the context of 
transition economies.  
Ashenfelter (1986). In this class of models bargaining is always related to both wages and 
employment and full insider control relates to the case, in which all bargaining strength lies with 
labour. In addition, Brown and Ashenfelter (1986) developed three alternative scenarios derived 
from the impact of internal and external wages on employment. If the alternative wage acts as 
the sole determinant of employment, the employment contract is said to be strongly efficient
4. 
That is, employment is set so as to equate the marginal revenue product of workers with the 
alternative wage. When both the internal and alternative wage are significant (negative) 
determinants of employment, employment determination is characterised as ‘weakly efficient’. If 
only the internal wage is instrumental in determining employment, the outcome is consistent 
with a third theoretical model, that is, one of monopolistic price setting by the union and 
unilateral employment setting by the employer (i.e. the ‘right to manage’ model)
 5. In this case 
employment will be lower than under efficient contracts. Brown and Ashenfelter test these 
hypotheses using US data for the period 1948-65, and are unable to reject the hypothesis that 
contracts are ‘weakly efficient’ but not ‘strongly efficient’.  
In merging the ‘right to manage’ model and the efficient contract model, Oswald (1993) offers a 
critique. He argues that, to the extent that unions are likely to focus on wages in the bargaining 
process rather than on the combination of employment and wages, it is perfectly plausible that 
‘efficient’ bargaining may produce outcomes consistent with the ‘right to manage’ outcome.  
On a related theme, an interesting implication stemming from Oswald’s (1993) analysis, and 
consistent with insider ownership/control is that the employment response may be weak or even 
negative in response to a positive demand shock. That is, we expect to observe asymmetry of 
outcomes in response to positive and negative demand shocks. The underlying motivation for the 
asymmetry hypothesis can be traced back to Lindbeck and Snower (1987) yet, in the context of 
the transition economies, asymmetry has a specific interpretation. In particular, asymmetry may 
be suggestive of inherited labour hoarding. In other words, because of existing labour reserves, 
employment is inelastic with respect to an increase in sales, but not with respect to a decrease. 
Even without inherited labour hoarding, weak or even negative upward output elasticity of 
                                                           
4 It can be traced back to the efficient bargaining model by Leontief (1946). 
5 Under this framework a union chooses a wage rate constrained by demand for its member’s labour and, as argued 
by Dunlop (1944), equilibria lie on the labour demand curve. It has been termed a monopoly union as its 
introduction into a competitive labour market would lead to a deadweight loss usually associated with monopoly 
(Currie, 1991, p.46).  
employment remains consistent with the insider hypothesis. More generally, in the absence of an 
‘insiders effect’ and without inherited labour hoarding we expect to observe symmetry.
6 
 
We reiterate that it is not our intention to subject these theories to testing here
7. Nevertheless, to 
understand and interpret our results it pays to keep in mind that alternative models of bargaining 
can produce similar testable hypotheses. From our point of view, two critical tests come from the 
fact that /i/ we expect employment to be less responsive in insider dominated companies, and /ii/ 
if, additionally, there is still asymmetry in response to negative and positive shocks, this can be 
viewed  as an indicator that the legacy of socialist labour hoarding may still impact upon firm 
behaviour. 
 
2.2. Empirical findings 
As appendix 1 illustrates, the early empirical evidence from the transition countries is strongly 
suggestive of negative wage elasticity of employment (to a declining degree as transition 
progresses) but there is little clear evidence relating to the outside option. For Poland, Basu et al. 
(2000) find own wage elasticity of –0.84 immediately after transition began; Grosfeld and Nivet 
present a figure of between –0.03 and –0.13 for the years 1988 – 1994; and Christev and Fitzroy 
(2002), using later data from 1994-1997, find wage elasticity of –0.08. For Hungary, Köllö 
(1998) finds elasticity declining from –0.6 to –0.3 by the start of transition. Körösi (2002), 
covering the period 1992-1999 for Hungary, finds that, in the initial years of transition, labour 
demand was much more responsive to own wages but by 1999 characteristics of employment 
adjustment in Hungarian firms, had converged on that of their Western counterparts. In sum, the 
literature suggests that own-wage elasticity coefficients  peaked in the early transition period.   
   
As witnessed by the growing body of research examining the relationship between ownership, 
control and employment patterns the issue of insider control manifestly relates to that of 
ownership. Konings et al. (1996) find evidence that, in the early transition period (i.e. pre 1991), 
new private firms, in which insiders are hypothesised to be less influential, contributed 
                                                           
6 Indeed, Haskel et al., (1997) study asymmetry in the UK. They find that employment adjustment is more common 
in times of a positive demand shock, as compared to a negative demand shock. Thus, there is evidence of 
asymmetry, but reversed as compared to transition economies. 
7 For a thorough discussion of the theoretical models, see for instance Layard et al. (1991) and Booth (1995).  
significantly to Polish job growth. Basu et al. (2000) and Grosfeld and Nivet (1997) did not find 
significant differences in employment behaviour for different ownership sectors in the early 
transition period in Poland (i.e. 1990-1991), but importantly, in neither case, were new firms 
identified. Grosfeld and Nivet (1997) offer an explanation for the absence of differences between 
privatised and state firms. Specifically, half of the privatised enterprises in their sample held an 
explicit commitment to keep employment levels stable during the first 1.5-3 years post-
privatisation. This suggests the need to examine more recent behaviour.  
Faggio and Konings (2003) examine job creation, destruction and employment growth in five 
transition economies: Poland, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania and Estonia, with firm level panel 
data from a similar period, i.e. 1993-97. They find that, in Poland and Romania, state ownership 
has a negative effect on employment growth in comparison with firms under majority private 
domestic ownership, and that large firms in more advanced transition economies downsized 
faster than in the laggards.
8 
 
2.2.1 Empirical findings on asymmetry 
Estrin and Svenjar (1998) and Kőllő (1998) investigate this asymmetry hypothesis by looking at 
employment growth differences among firms experiencing/not experiencing declining real sales. 
Based on data from the early transition period (1986-9, 1989-2 and 1992-3) Kőllő finds that the 
elasticity of labour demand is relatively high for firms with decreasing output (0.2-0.3), yet 
insignificant for those with increasing output. This is a finding consistent with the inherited 
labour surplus hypothesis. Moreover the relationship between output and employment became 
stronger over time, especially for privatised firms (Ibidem, p.92 and 100). Estrin and Svenjar 
(1998), using firm level data from 1988-1993 for Poland, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic and 
Hungary, also test the asymmetry hypothesis. Their results reveal that employment responded to 
both decreasing and increasing sales, but that the response was higher for firms with increasing 
sales: 0.36-0.44 as opposed to 0.12-0.35.  
Christev and Fitzroy (2002) focus on Polish firms for a later period (1994 – 1997) than that 
covered by the above studies. They estimate an equation in first differences using GMM 
                                                           
8 Papers on other transition countries, discussing ownership cross sections include Konings et al. (2003) on Ukraine, 
Rutkowski (2002) on Croatia, Brown and Earle (2002) and Konings and Lehmann (2001) on Russia, Dong (1988) 
and Lee (1999) on China.  See summary in appendix 1.  
Arellano-Bond (1991) methods and split the variables for positive and negative growth of output. 
They find that employment growth responds only to decreasing sales and offer the interpretation 
that inherited labour hoarding persisted among Polish firms in that period. It is worth noting 
however, that the sample of these authors’ did not include de novo firms, in which labour 
hoarding should not be observed. On the other hand, they find that state owned enterprises are 
characterised by a far smaller significant response to negative shocks than either the firms 
privatised to outsiders or firms included in the National Investment Funds programme. Again, 
this finding would appear to be consistent with insiders’ control. 
Similar results were obtained by Kőrősi (2002), who estimated labour demand equations 
annually for the period 1992–1999 for medium and large Hungarian firms. Interestingly, when 
the sample is restricted first to manufacturing firms, and second to engineering firms alone, the 
difference in employment response between firms with increasing and decreasing output seems 
to disappear in the most recent period. Accounting for sectoral differences may be important in 
so far as sectoral heterogeneity masks certain underlying trends, such as the fact that the impact 
of initial labour hoarding may be decreasing over time
9.  
 
Finally, size may also matter. Typically, smaller firms were more likely to be privatised and new 
companies are smaller by design at least in the early period. This implies a correlation between 
size and ownership, which may affect the robustness of conclusions. Several studies tackle this 
issue directly. Kőllő (1998) controls for small and large firms. His results for Hungarian firms 
reveal that small firms are characterised by stronger employment growth. Similarly, Faggio and 
Konings (2003) report a clear relationship between employment growth and initial size: larger 
firms are negatively associated with employment growth. Christev and Fitzroy (2002) include a 
variable to represent average firm size and find that larger firms tend to grow more slowly. As 
our sample is drawn from the largest Polish firms, extrapolation of our results to small firms 
should be viewed cautiously.  
So, what lessons can be culled from this literature to inform our examination of the employment 
behaviour of large Polish firms? First, if employees attach significant weight to wages in the 
                                                           
9 This does present a potential empirical problem in the short run. While sectoral affiliation is a binary indicator, the 
real processes are continuous in character. The transition trend towards ‘tertiarisaiton’ likely relates to most post-
socialist manufacturing companies without necessarily being reflected in sectoral statistics.   
bargaining process then we should observe a negative correlation between employment and 
internal wages and thus can reject the ‘strong efficiency hypothesis’. Second, if insiders maintain 
control over firms, we will observe low responsiveness of employment to final output. Third, 
since low upwards employment elasticity is also consistent with the labour hoarding story, it is 
both (i) low downwards elasticity and (ii) low upwards employment elasticity, which are 
indicative of a strong insider domination, in contrast with a situation, where only the latter holds. 
Finally, as a consequence of weak insider effects alongside an absence of residual labour 
hoarding,  de novo enterprises should exhibit a positive association between output and 
employment growth.  
 
2.  METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH AND DATA 
3.1 Data 
This study is based on data procured from publicly available company level information relating 
to Poland’s largest companies. The data is sourced from a project (with participation of one of 
the co-authors), financed by the Polish Committee for Scientific Research (grant 1H02C-024-
19)
10 and utilises all publicly available information on Poland’s largest companies. Information 
is sourced from the Warsaw Stock Exchange and several lists of the 500 largest (revenue) 
companies published by journals and magazines, including Rzeczpospolita,  Polityka,  Gazeta 
Bankowa,  Nowe Zycie Gospodarcze,  Zycie Gospodarcze and Businessman. Ultimately, the 
veracity of the information used is verified and corrected in line with the companies’ annual 
reports - now accessible in most cases. Our panel of firms is unbalanced since, inevitably, there 
are missing values for certain companies, in certain years. In addition, to limit the impact of 
potential measurement error, we eliminate 0.5% of observations in each tail of our key 
variables.
11  
 
Apart from standard type errors, there were several other noteworthy problems encountered 
during data processing. In principle, Polish state companies were prevented from buying shares 
                                                           
10 Other results of the project are available in an edited volume in Polish (Baltowski, 2002). 
11 On inspection, the observations in the tails cannot be explained other than as measurement errors. Typically, the 
inclusion of outliers makes rejecting the null hypotheses easier and inflates the coefficients upwards. These results 
are available from the authors on request.  
in other privatised companies. In reality, this applied neither to privatisations (or semi-
privatisations) resulting from bank-led restructuring programmes, nor to post-privatisation 
ownership transfers including, for instance, companies privatised via the National Investment 
Funds programme. As a consequence, a number of ‘privatised’ companies are wrongly attributed 
to the private sector rather than to the state sector. These cases are not necessarily easy to detect, 
due to the multi-layered nature of cross-company ownership, but the data has been corrected 
where possible. On a related theme there are problems with distinguishing the dominant 
ownership class from minority owner groups. There are also cases of companies being wrongly 
classified as ‘de novo’ private companies, either because they have been formally registered as a 
new company as part of the privatisation proceedings, or because they are new companies 
created by other state-controlled firms. The former case relates in particular to companies 
privatised through employee buy-outs (see Mickiewicz and Baltowski, 2003). We are also aware 
of the fact that some sources do not distinguish between individual companies and consolidated 
balances of capital groups with similar names. Compiling both categories into one time series 
would create a serious data distortion. 
  
In keeping with the literature we choose to use aggregate price indices to transform nominal 
series. In particular, following Christev and Fitzroy (2002) and Currie (1991) we use CPI since, 
arguably, use of PPI at sectoral level would erase some of the effects we are particularly 
interested in. Thus, while using the aggregate price index, we do not eliminate the impact of 
shifts in relative sectoral prices on total revenue. This is important because we wish the change 
in revenue to incorporate the impact of sectoral demand for the final product.  
 
The construction of the ownership cross-section is far from straightforward and no approach is 
exempt from criticism. Though it is straightforward to identify de novo firms, since by definition 
they are a time invariant category, problems arise as soon as we begin to construct ownership 
indicators for privatised versus state companies. To reduce potential endogeneity, one approach 
could be to use pre-sample information on ownership to partition the data and hence treat 
ownership as time invariant. However, in most cases, future information pertaining to ownership 
was available in pre-sample time and it has been well established that the privatisation processes  
impacted upon firm behaviour prior to the formal privatisation date.
12 This being so, treating 
ownership as pre-determined is unlikely to remove any potential endogeneity and a better option 
could be to distinguish between those companies, privatised during the period in question and 
those which were not. Yet, even then, some companies in the state group might again expect 
privatisation after the sample period and the impact of future expectation is not eliminated. In 
our specifications we utilise time variant dummy variables for our state and privatised categories, 
but note that estimates based on alternative ownership specifications, in line with those described 
above, do not affect the key results. 
 
An appealing feature of our data is that, through the details concerning company and location, 
we are able to match the enterprises with corresponding administrative units and subsequently 
with appropriate regional labour market indicators, available from the Polish Central Statistical 
Office. We also adopt the public infrastructure indices, developed by Duffy and Walsh (2001) 
that rank voivodships according to six infrastructure indicators.
13 However, assigning companies 
to regions created its own methodological challenges. 25% of the companies included in the 
sample are registered in Warsaw. These can be considered in two sub-categories: companies 
operating nation-wide, and those whose operations are located in the capital city. 9% of 
companies, typically in manufacturing production, are in the latter category. The remaining 
enterprises registered in Warsaw (16% of the sample) we consider to be nation-wide, typically 
consisting of trade companies and retail network firms, but also producers with several major 
sites. We attribute national averages of the relevant labour market indicators in the case of those 
companies labelled nation-wide. 
 
The above caveats aside our firm level data is relatively rich and concentrates on the largest 
Polish firms. We have reliable information on employment levels, wage levels, total earnings, 
ownership status and the sector of activity supplemented with information on regional wages, 
sectoral wages, unemployment and public infrastructure. Appendix 2 provides full variable 
definitions while Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the key variables. 
                                                           
12 See Megginson and Netter (2001) for further discussion on methodology. 
13 These indicators relate to the number of telephones, fax machines, railways and public roads in the region as well 
as the urban share of the population and the share of services in total regional employment.   
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics, 1998-2002: 25
th , 50
th  and 75
th  percentiles. 
 
Category  ∆Number of 
employees 
∆ Real 
wage 
∆ Real total 
revenue 
All companies  -10.2%
-2.4%
1.3%
-4.1%
1.7%
6.1%
-9.5% 
1.9% 
10.1% 
State firms  -8.5%
-2.4%
-0.3%
-3.0%
1.7%
4.6%
-9.9% 
**-0.8% 
7.0% 
Privatised firms  -16.9%
***-4.2%
2.1%
-5.8%
1.7%
9.4%
-11.3% 
†-1.2% 
11.1% 
De novo firms  -7.4%
***1.4%
12.4%
-7.0%
1.4%
9.4%
-5.5% 
***5.1% 
18.6% 
Companies in regions with poor 
infrastructure (I-IV) 
-8.6%
-2.3%
0.2%
-3.8%
1.7%
5.5%
-8.3% 
1.4% 
9.8% 
Companies in regions with average 
infrastructure (V) 
-14.9%
*-3.1%
-0.2%
-4.9%
1.7%
5.6%
-11.6% 
**-1.7% 
7.5% 
Companies in regions with best 
infrastructure (VI) 
-10.2%
-2.5%
2.2%
-4.4%
1.8%
7.3%
-0.8% 
0.7% 
10.0% 
Companies with several major locations 
nation-wide 
-8.4%
*-0.6%
10.6%
-7.8%
1.0%
8.6%
-11.2% 
†2.2% 
16.9% 
Notes: 
(1)  The numbers given in each cell are 25
th , 50
th  and 75
th  percentiles respectively. 
(2)  For computational ease, percentage changes are approximated by logarithmic differences. 
(3)  *** Significant at 0.001; ** Significant at 0.01; * Significant at 0.05; †Significant at 0.1. Significance levels 
relate to Pearson χ
2 (continuity corrected) based on the non-parametric test on the equality of medians. 
 
Interestingly, in terms of both revenue and employment dynamics, the performance of state 
companies is superior to their privatised counterparts possibly as a result of post-privatisation 
restructuring. The main difference however seems to be between these two groups and de novo 
firms, for which the growth of both employment and output is high, and the difference with the 
two other categories is highly significant. It is also worth noting that for the state firms, the 
distribution of the percentage change in employment seems to have more mass in the centre, as  
compared with the other categories. This is illustrated by lower absolute values at  both the 25
th  
and 75
th percentiles. Thus, even at this preliminary stage of analysis we  detect lower 
responsiveness of employment levels in state sector firms. The pattern related to the quality of 
infrastructure in a firms locality is not clear cut. Interestingly however, companies operating 
nation-wide exhibit better performance than the rest of the sample, in terms of both employment 
and revenue dynamics.  
 
3.2  Econometric Techniques and Specification 
To explore the hypotheses outlined above we employ generalised method of moments techniques 
(GMM). In their seminal paper, Arellano and Bond (1991) find that GMM is superior to 
instrumental variable estimators and recommend one step GMM for inference (Ibidem, p.293). 
More recently, Judson and Owen (1999) support the conclusion that this estimation method is 
superior to feasible alternatives for unbalanced panels with a short time dimension. The GMM 
estimator is robust in that it does not require information pertaining to the exact distribution of 
the disturbances and is instrumental in combating the problems associated with potential 
endogeneity. The estimator allows for the endogeneity of all regressors by using predetermined 
variables as efficient instruments. In essence, this model involves estimation in differenced form 
of the general distributed-lag model.  
 
We have made several informed choices in our specification of the model and comment upon 
these briefly. Firstly, following Arellano-Bond methodology, we transformed variables into first 
(logarithmic) differences to alleviate possible problems relating to individual fixed effects. 
Secondly, in view of the relatively small sample size, we adopt a conservative approach in our 
choice of ownership categories. We focus our attention on the three ownership categories – state, 
privatised and de novo – described in appendix 2. Our key indicator of the enterprises financial 
position is the revenue growth experienced by the firm – a variable we interact in various ways 
to investigate the hypotheses outlined in the previous section. 
 
We estimate the following basic specification:  
) 1 ( _ _
_ sec _ _ _ 1
it t T it S it O it wage regional real
it wage toral real it revenue real it wage real it employment it employment
υ γ + ∑ + ∑ + ∑ + + ∆ +
∆ + ∆ + ∆ + − ∆ = ∆
Z
  
where Oit, Sit and Tit relate to ownership, sectoral and time controls respectively and Z is a matrix 
of interactive effects with a corresponding column vector of coefficients γ. As the variables are 
first-differenced, the inclusion of sectoral controls is not a necessity, as individual unobservable 
effects are taken care of, however we follow here the practice of some other researchers 
(Christev and FitzRoy (2002) in particular). 
 
We estimate equation (1) without ownership and interactive effects and report our results in 
column 1, Table 2. Specification (2) introduces the first ownership test by interacting both 
revenue growth and wage growth with the dummy for state ownership. In the specifications (3)-
(7), we drop the wage interactive term and introduce a differential slope coefficient, taking the 
value 0 for firms with positive revenue growth and the actual value of the negative revenue 
change for the remaining firms. This specification enables an initial test for signs of asymmetry. 
This term is then interacted with ownership dummies to further explore dimensions of 
asymmetry. That is, we are able to investigate the asymmetry hypothesis without dividing the 
sample into sub-groups. We then modify the composition of outside controls to obtain 
specifications (3)-(7). Specifically, specification (4) omits  sectoral wages; specification (5) 
introduces regional infrastructure effects, including a dummy variable for firms operating in 
multiple locations; specification (6) retains the infrastructure controls at the expense of regional 
wages; and specification (7) retains the dummy for multiple location, drops the other 
infrastructure dummies and reintroduces a control for the regional wage. Finally we carry out  
two additional tests. Specification (8) introduces differential effects for de novo firms, enabling 
us to detect differential slope coefficients for all three ownership groups and  to assess the 
difference between new private firms and privatised firms, in addition to the difference between 
the state sector and the aggregate private sector. Specification (9) retains controls and interactive 
effects for both state and de novo firms, but eliminates variables relating to asymmetry. In short, 
(9) is a specification similar to the basic specification (2), but distinguishing between all three 
ownership groups, to establish whether our focus on the private-state nexus was justified. 
  
4. RESULTS 
As expected, the lagged dependent variable is positive and significant, with the corresponding 
coefficient taking values between 0.22 and 0.29 in alternative specifications. This result reflects 
a somewhat smaller effect than Christev and Fitzroy (2002) who cover similar firms in an earlier 
period and obtain an estimated coefficient of 0.7 on lagged employment growth. Both cases 
suggest that employment growth is path dependent and that the empirical approach taken is 
therefore appropriate. The internal wage is negatively significant with a coefficient varying 
narrowly between –.57 and -.60 across the specifications. Higher internal wage growth is 
associated with lower employment growth and the ‘strong efficiency’ hypothesis is clearly 
rejected. The size of the effect is higher than that found by both Christev and Fitzroy  (2002) and 
Grosfeld and Nivet (1997), but lower than that found by Basu et al. (2000). Turning to outside 
options we find that sectoral wages and regional wages are positive but that only the latter are 
significant
14. According to the ‘weak efficiency’ hypothesis the outside wage available to 
workers should be negatively related to employment change but, just as Brown and Ashenfelter 
(1986) found it “frequently positively related to employment” so too do we. It would seem to be 
the case that higher regional wages may reflect some factor other than the bargaining relations of 
firms and employees. This is a theme to which we return later. In terms of total revenue change 
we find a positive relationship with employment change, suggesting that output expansions are 
being transformed into employment growth as opposed to only wage growth. For the whole 
sample (Table 2, specification (1)), the output elasticity of employment is 0.28, which is entirely 
consistent with other studies for both Poland and Hungary (Basu et al. (2000), Kőllő (1998), 
Grosfeld and Nivet (1997)). 
We turn now to ownership effects. The ownership dummies reveal that, compared to privatised 
and de novo firms, state sector firms have significantly lower employment growth, and the result 
is consistent across the specifications. This is as we would expect. On the other hand, we are 
unable to detect any effect related to the difference between de novo and privatised firms (Table 
3, specifications (8) and (9)). 
The sectoral controls point towards higher employment growth in the utilities sector and lower 
employment growth for the mining & heavy industry and construction sectors. We have 
particular confidence in the robustness of these results since not only are they consistent across  
specifications but they are also based on orthogonal contrasts rather than reflecting simple 
sectoral dummies. In particular, the poor performance of employment in the mining and heavy 
industry sector is consistent with the prior knowledge. 
In specification (2) we add additional controls, interacting state ownership with both the own 
wage and total revenue. The results demonstrate the existence of clearly differing dynamics 
depending on ownership status. The negative association of the state/revenue interactive term 
shows that revenue growth in state firms translates into far lower employment growth than in 
other firms. This is consistent with either an interpretation of excess ‘inherited labour’ or of 
insiders appropriating rent in the form of wages as enterprise revenues grow. The latter 
explanation garners support from the fact that wage increases in state firms are more weakly 
associated with employment declines  than is the case for other firms
15. Taken together these two 
findings imply some element of ‘insider control’ in state firms. 
 
Table 3 reports the results of our investigation of the asymmetry hypothesis. In specification (3), 
we estimate a version of specification (1) with the inclusion of a differential slope coefficient 
identifying the level of revenue change among firms experiencing declines in revenue. We also 
interact this term with the state sector dummy. We find the former coefficient to be negative but 
insignificant, suggesting that for negative revenue growth firms, the employment with respect to 
sales elasticity is lower than that predicted by the aggregate relationship incorporating the 
positive revenue growth firms. This is indicative of a general asymmetry effect – namely that 
employment is more responsive upwards than downwards – though the general asymmetry effect 
appears weak. This is potentially important since it diverges from the findings of earlier periods. 
For example, Christev and Fitzroy (2002) find that sales increases have little effect on 
employment growth whereas employment does respond to falling sales. Similar results were 
obtained by Kőllő (1998) for the early transition period in Hungary. For the early transition 
period, this was interpreted as evidence of high levels of initial labour hoarding enabling firms to 
expand output without increasing employment. In so far as such an interpretation is correct, our 
findings go some way to establishing that the initial ‘widespread labour hoarding’ may be over. 
Hence, when firms experience a positive demand shock they are inclined to adjust their labour 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
14 We also experimented with a regional unemployment measure but found that to be highly insignificant. 
15 .It should be noted however that this differential effect is marginally insignificant.  
force accordingly. It is only in the state sector, where output elasticity is generally dramatically 
lower, that we still observe the response to output decline being stronger than that to the output 
increase. But even in state sector firms, the difference is no longer significant. To see if our 
conclusions are robust we experiment with alternative sets of outside options in specifications 
(3)-(7) and find that our asymmetry results hold. 
In specification (8) we introduce additional effects for de novo firms. Output elasticity of 
employment is stronger in privatised companies than in de novo companies where the output 
growth is positive, but the differences between the two groups are not significant. It is interesting 
to contrast that conclusion with the analysis based on descriptive statistics presented earlier. The 
highly significant and positive difference in the employment growth of de novo firms compared 
with other sectors, vanishes once we subject it to a multivariate approach and control for 
endogeneity using the GMM Arellano-Bond framework. Once more, the main difference is that 
for state firms with positive employment growth, the increase in employment for a given change 
in revenue is lower than for other firms. Taken together, this implies that expanding firms do 
indeed turn revenue growth into higher employment but that state firms do so at a lesser rate. In 
comparison, negative revenue growth per se does not imply anything for employment growth but 
again, among state owned firms, negative revenue growth is associated with lower employment 
elasticities compared with other sectors.  
Christev and Fitzroy (2002), separating their sample into firms with positive and negative sales 
growth, conclude that there is no evidence of a ‘significant positive employment response to 
positive sales growth’. This is taken as evidence of continuing labour hoarding. Our results offer 
a more optimistic interpretation of the progress of enterprise restructuring in Poland. In particular 
our more recent data reveals clear evidence that a strong positive response to revenue growth has 
emerged in large Polish firms, yet  only in the private sector. For state owned firms the effect is 
significantly weaker and close to zero. That is, outside of state owned firms, labour hoarding is 
no longer a significant impediment to employment growth. In addition, state firms with negative 
revenue growth also exhibit lower employment elasticities than the aggregate suggests. The 
latter observation is in line with Christev and Fitzroy (2002) who find that ‘state owned 
enterprises exhibit the smallest significant response to negative shocks’. But generally, we find 
no significant evidence of asymmetry between firms experiencing negative as opposed to  
positive revenue growth, regardless of the ownership sector. Somewhat surprisingly, in the 
aggregate, it no longer fits the ‘transition model’.  
In fact, we find that, employment responds positively to revenue growth but less strongly to 
revenue falls and so is already more in keeping with western economic models (e.g. Haskel et al, 
1997). Notwithstanding this, elements of an ‘unreformed’ state sector still persist. State firms, 
whether experiencing expanding revenues or otherwise, exhibit lower employment elasticities 
than all firms. This result hints at alternative interpretations. First, it is consistent with sustained 
or consolidated insider (employee) control, where firms are less likely to raise employment in 
response to positive shocks and to lay off workers when faced with negative shocks. 
Alternatively, assuming that some labour hoarding was still present in state companies, an 
increase in revenue may help the companies to cover the costs of redundancies while, in the 
absence of growth, labour shedding is not possible.  
Table 3 also contains potentially important results concerning outside options. Consistent with a 
series of empirical studies stretching back to Brown and Ashenfelter (1986) the coefficient for 
regional wages is positive and significant across our specifications. The reasons for this 
persistent result have not been explicitly identified to date. One possible explanation is that the 
regional wage may be a proxy for some alternative characteristic of the regional economy 
associated with firm growth. To investigate whether the variable reflects regional economic 
performance we experimented by including a regional unemployment variable but found this to 
be consistently insignificant. Hence, as a first stab at investigating this important issue we 
include regional infrastructure variables in specifications (5) and (6). Not only are our other 
findings robust to this variation but we find evidence that firms in regions with the best public 
infrastructure have higher levels of employment growth. This is clearly of interest to policy 
makers. On a related issue, firms operating in multiple regions also outperform other firms. The 
latter finding may partially reflect a firms propensity to locate multiple branches rationally and 
related efficiency gains, which are transformed into employment generation. 
  
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Using data from a panel of large Polish firms, covering a longer and later period than other 
studies (e.g. Grosfeld and Nivet (1997), Basu et al., (2000) and Christev and Fitzroy (2002)) we 
make a series of interesting and important findings concerning firm employment behaviour. Not 
only does our data enable us to investigate employment determination further into the transition 
period but also allows us to identify de novo companies, which by the late 1990’s were already 
appearing among Poland’s largest firms.  
 
First, we find that employment is affected by internal wages and not external wages. This may 
reflect monopoly price setting unions and unilateral employment setting by the employer (Brown 
and Ashenfelter, 1986), regardless of the ownership sector. 
 
Second, as far as the asymmetry hypothesis is concerned, our results differ form earlier studies 
such as Kőllő (1998) and Christev and Fitzroy (2002). We find that firms no longer only respond 
to a decline in real total revenue, but to a positive demand shock too, suggesting that the earlier 
residual labour hoarding is now over. 
  
Third, it is clear in all specifications that firm performance (measured as growth in real total 
revenue
16) translates into employment growth. Similarly, poor performance (negative real output 
growth) is accompanied by lower elasticity of employment, but the difference between positive 
and negative growth is not significant.  
 
The most compelling result of our analysis is that state sector firms exhibit far lower output 
elasticities of employment than firms in the private sector. In the case of positive output growth, 
the employment elasticity oscillates around zero. 
 
Finally, our analysis offers up some crucial issues for further investigation and for policy makers 
to be aware of. In particular, it would seem that the quality of public infrastructure plays an 
                                                           
16 Earnings before taxes were largely insignificant.  
important role in firm development. Our proxies for this characteristic are highly aggregated in 
this analysis but provide strong motivation for further research in this area. 
 
Overall, our analysis offers up a clearer picture of employment determination in the later 
transition period. With the progress of privatisation, and the downsizing of state sector firms, 
visible in our results, the industrial structure is clearly still evolving and one may expect 
aggregate employment elasticities to increase over time. Currently Poland is experiencing high 
levels of unemployment and no net employment creation. Our results shed some light on the 
micro behaviour influencing those macro indicators.  
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Table 2: Own wages, outside options and ownership:  
 
Dependent variable: ∆ Employment  Specification: 
 (1)    (2) 
Lagged dependent variable  0.283 (0.07)***  0.216 (0.07)*** 
∆ Real wage  -0.593 (0.05)***  -0.596 (0.06)*** 
∆ Real total revenue  0.308 (0.03)***  0.435 (0.04)*** 
∆ Real sectoral wage  0.203 (0.21)  0.251 (0.20) 
∆ Real regional wage  1.091 (0.37) **  1.153 (0.35) *** 
State ownership   -0.037 (0.01)**  -0.045 (0.01)*** 
De novo ownership  0.009 (0.02)  0.005 (0.02) 
∆ Real wage * state  -  0.122 (0.09) 
∆ Real revenue * state  -  -0.366 (0.06)*** 
Service sector versus industry  0.002 (0.00)  0.001 (0.00) 
Trade sector versus other services  -0.001 (0.01)  0.003 (0.01) 
Mining & heavy ind. versus other industry  -0.005 (0.00)*  -0.005 (0.00)* 
Utilities sector versus other industry  0.008 (0.00)***  0.008 (0.00)*** 
Construction sector versus other industry  -0.022 (0.00)***  -0.022 (0.00)*** 
Engineering sector v. other manufacturing  -0.008 (0.27)  -0.008 (0.27) 
Chemical sector v. other manufacturing  -0.007 (0.01)  -0.008 (0.005) 
Constant  -0.010 (0.02)  -0.008 (0.02) 
Second-order autocorrelation: z  -0.52  -0.77 
Sargan test: χ
2 16.41  11.38 
Number of firms  268  268 
Number of observations  670  670 
Notes: 
1.  Estimator: Arellano-Bond 1 step generalised method of moments. 
2.  *** Significant at 0.001; ** Significant at 0.01; *Significant at 0.05; † Significant at 0.1 
3.  Standard errors in parentheses.  
4.  Time dummies included. 
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Appendix 2: Definition of Variables 
 
Variable name  Description of variable  Details / comments 
state ownership  State owned firm (dummy, time variant)  Contemporaneous state ownership 
dummy 
de_novo ownership  De novo private firm (dummy, time 
invariant) 
A new private company, i.e. which 
is neither state owned nor was ever 
state owned 
privatised  Privatised firm (dummy, time variant)  Contemporaneous privatised 
dummy 
employment  Natural logarithm of number of 
employees 
Available for 1996-2002 
 
real wage  Natural logarithm of real wage cost  Ln of (average monthly wage cost 
in zlotys/consumer price index). 
Data 1996, 1998-2002. CPI: 
Central Statistical Office 
real total revenue  Natural logarithm of real total revenue
18  Total revenue/CPI. Available for 
1996-2002. 
∆ real total revenue  Change in revenue given as logarithmic 
difference (the operator  ∆ has the same 
meaning for other variables) 
 
∆ revenue * state  
(de novo) 
refers to the interaction of the state/de 
novo dummy with the given variable (in 
this example: with revenue change) 
 
negative (positive)  
∆ revenue 
Negative (positive) revenue growth, i.e. a 
variable which replicates  for values of  
∆ real total revenue>0 (<0) and takes 
zero in other cases  
By constructution, the variable 
enables to test the differential 
effect as compared with the source 
variable (i.e. both ∆ real total revenue 
and  negative (positive) ∆  revenue 
should be included in any given 
specification) 
negative (positive) ∆ 
revenue * state (de 
novo) 
The variable defined in the previous row 
multiplied by the state (de novo) dummy 
 
continued 
 
                                                           
18 We also have data on sales. Sales could be a better measure, i.e. more related to outcome from operations, but the 
data is less complete for that variable and correlation between sales and revenues is very close to one. Therefore, we 
opt for revenues. Estimations based on sales are available on request.  
 
 
Variable name  Description of variable  Details / comments 
Year controls  1999, 2000, 2001 dummies  Four  years  allowed  given  the 
GMM lag structure 
Sectoral controls  -  services versus industry 
-  trade versus other services, 
-  mining & heavy industry versus other 
industry, 
-  utilities versus other industry,  
-  construction versus other industry, 
-  engineering v. other manufacturing, 
-  chemical v. other manufacturing  
Sectoral controls are constructed 
as orthogonal contrasts. When 
replaced by simple dummies, the 
results do not change. However, 
using orthogonal contrasts allows 
the sectoral controls to be 
uncorrelated with each other. 
Moreover, instead of being 
constructed as the difference 
against one benchmark group, the 
orthogonal contrasts allow 
describing the structure of sectoral 
differences in a more reach way. 
Details of coding are available on 
request. 
External 
characteristics 
   
real sectoral wage  Logarithm of real sectoral wages  Logarithm  of  (average  monthly 
wage in zlotys/CPI). Available for 
1996-2001, two digit NACE 
sectors 
real regional wage  Logarithm of real regional wage  Central Statistical Office data. At 
the provincial level; 17 (new) 
provinces. Annual average. 
Available 1998-2001 
poor infrastructure  Categories I-IV of the taxonomy of public 
infrastructure of Polish regions (based on 
49 regions) 
average 
infrastructure 
Category V 
best infrastructure  Category VI 
Based directly on Duffy and 
Walsh (2001), which offers 
detailed description; clustering of 
categories I-IV in our sample 
results from the fact that there was 
a small number of companies in 
each of the four; 
Ranking is constructed in such a 
way that category VI corresponds 
to best infrastructure 
multiple locations  Dummy for companies operating 
nationwide 
Companies within this category 
were not assigned to any 
infrastructure category. In other 
words this and the previous three 
categories are mutually exclusive 
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